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What is a Fall? 
Fall is "an event which results in a person 
coming to rest unintentionally on the ground or 
other lower level, not by the result of a major 
intrinsic event such as (stroke) or 
overwhelming hazard." (Tinetti, 1988) Falls are 
under the umbrella of System Safety. 
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Note: Falls impact the entire human body. According to BLS 2007, there were approximately 300k falls that affected the human body. 
Falls in an Aerospace Environment 
• High risk exists in multiple tasks 
• Work is performed at excessive heights 
• Potential for high consequence outcomes 
• Unique characteristics of environment and 
equipment 
Problem Statement 
• There are NASA/KSC environments where 
employees are required to perform tasks from heights 
that are high risk for falls. 
• To address the issue NASA contracted with Gravitec 
Systems Inc., a fall-protection engineering firm to 
developed a hazard ranking system to assess fall 
hazards. 
- The hazard ranking system was established based on the 
assumption that multiple factors such human factors, 
environmental factors, and working conditions have a 
uniform influence on falls. (The ranking system has not 
been validated) 
Research Purpose 
-Research, develop, and validate a 
fuzzy AHP quantifiable model that 
can be applied in aerospace 
environments 
- Validate the present of fall hazards 
atNASNKSC 
-Validate the Gravitec model 
Research Hypotheses 
(Null and Alternative) 
Ho:The development of a conceptual model that 
characterizes risk factors can be useful in reducing the 
likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations 
HI:The development of a conceptual model that 
characterizes risk factors cannot be useful in reducing the 
likelihood of falls in NASA Ground Support Operations 
Ho: A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model can be 
developed and validated to predict the likelihood of falls in 
NASA Ground Support Operations. 
HI : A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process model can not be 
developed and validated to predict the likelihood of falls in 
NASA Ground Support Operations. 
Theoretical Foundation 
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Note: The information processing and ergonomic model is the theoretical basis for the research, categorization of risk factors, and the 
model development. In this theoretical model, there is a risk of slip, trips, and falls. Falls are a greater risk in an aerospace environment. 
Comparative Analysis 
Multiple Factors that contribute to falls 
General Work Environment 
• Experience (OF) 
• Job and Safety Program (OF) 
• Type ofTaskiActivity (TF) 
• Sex/Gender (HF) 
• Load weight (TF) 
• Environmental Conditions (EF) 
• Task Frequency (TF) 
• Task Duration (TF) 
• Slip and Trip (HF) 
• Environmental Surface (EF) 
• Slip and Trip (HF) 
• Poor Lighting (EF) 
• Day of the week (EF) 
• Occupation/Industry sector (OF) 
• Coefficient of Friction (EF) 
• Time of Day for the fall (EF) 
• Coefficient of Friction (EF) 
• Fall Distance (EF) 
• Age (HF) 
Aerospace Environment (NASA Ground Support Operations) 
• Worker Interference (HF) 
• Number of Workers (HF) 
• Age (HF) 
• Fall Distance (EF) 
• Environmental Condit ions (EF) 
• Environmental Surface (EF) 
• Task Duration (TF) 
• Task Frequency (TF) 
• Fall Hazard Severity (OF) 
• Fall Hazard Protection (OF) 
• Fall Hazard Occunence (OF) 
• Task Proximity (TF) 
Legend 
OF-Organizational Factor 
EF-Environmental Factor 
TF-Task Related Factor 
HF-HumanlPersonal Factor 
Benchmark: The risk factors were observed multiple times (3 reoccunences) in the literature and there was a common thread in the Bureau of 
Labor Statisti cs (BLS) Data, Liberty Mutual Data, Mishap Data, IRIS , Empirical Studies, Safety Mishap Data, and NASA/Gravitec Fall Hazard 
Analysis Repon . The risk factors wi ll be assessed and used in the fuzzy AHP model. The li st is not conclusive. 
Final Conceptual Model 
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Fall Hazard Severity 
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Fall Hazard Occurrence 
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Research Gaps and Objectives 
Research Gaps 
Knowledge and understanding of 
contributing risk factors that influence 
falls in NASA ground support 
operations (Hongwei Hsiao, 2008; Petre 
Simeonova, 2001) 
Aggregate impact of risk factors that 
influence falls and Interactive Nature of ~ I ~ 
Risk Factors (Gauchard, G., 2001) 
...... 
.... 
I 
Model that Quantifies risk factors ~ 
that influence falls in NASA ground4"" 
support operations 
(Dagdeviren, M., 2008) 
Research Objectives 
Identify and classify risk factors that 
influence falls in an aerospace 
environment 
Develop a conceptual model that includes 
multiple risk factors that contribute to falls 
(i.e. human/personal, task related, 
environmental organizational) , 
"" Develop and validate a fuzzy analytical 
,..,.".."". hierarchy process model to predict the 
likelihood of falls in an aerospace 
environment (NASA ground support 
operations) and aid in the design of work 
areas. 
Research Phases 
1. Knowledge Acquisition 
2. Data Collection 
3. Subject Matter Experts' (SMEs) interviews 
4. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
5 . Weight Validation 
6. Fuzzification of variables 
7. Membership Functions Development 
8. Fuzzy Qualification using Fuzzy set theory 
9. Fuzzy Quantification using Fuzzy set theory 
10. Model Development 
11. Model Usability 
12. Model Validation 
Research Variables 
-Dependent Variable: Fall (effect) 
-Independent Variable: Factors that 
contribute to falls (cause) are the 
following: 
- task related 
- human/personal 
- organizational 
- environmental 
Research Questions 
• What are the contributing risk factors that 
influence falls in the workplace? 
• How do we quantify contributing risk factors 
that influence falls in NASA ground support 
operations? 
• What is aggregate risk value of these risk 
factors on falls? 
• How we will predict the likelihood of falls? 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) Model 
Affinity Diagram 
Saaty, 1990 
Organizational Factors 
Fall Hazard Severity 
Fall Hazard Protection 
Fall Hazard Occurrence 
Environmental CondHions 
Environmental Surface 
Fall Distance 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) 
Team 1 Team 2 
1 Fall Protection Expert 1 Fall Protection Expert 
1 Human Factors Expert 1 Human Factors Expert 
1 Safety Expert 1 Safety Expert 
Results and Discussion 
Task Factors 
Human/Personal Factors 
Environmental Factors 
Organizational Factors 
Categorical Factors 
Risk Factors Relative Weights 
Expert Choice Results 
Task Frequency .451 
Task Proximity .381 
Task Duration .168 
Inconsistency = 0.11 
with 0 missing judgments. 
Worker Interference .528 
Number of Workers .263 
Age .209 
Inconsistency = 0.01 
w~h 0 missing judgments. 
Environmental Suface .422 
Environmental Condition .298 
Fall Distance .279 
Inconsistency = 0.11 
w~h 0 missing judgments. 
Fall Hazard Occurence .356 
Fall Hazard Protection .354 
Fall Hazard Severity .289 
Inconsistency = 0.00 
w~h 0 missing judgments. 
Task Related Fadors .314 
Human/Personal Factors .307 
Organizational Factors .130 
Environmental Factors .248 
Inconsistency = 0.01 
w~h 0 missing judgments. 
Synthesis 
Synthesis with respect to: 
Goal: Weighting risk factors that contribute to falls in NASA Ground Support Opertations 
Ove raj I Inconsistency = .07 
Task Duration .053 
Task Frequency .142 
Task Proximity .120 
Age .064 
Nurrber d Workers .081 
Worker Interference .162 
Fall Hazard Severity .038 
Fall Hazard Occurence .046 
Fall Hazard Protection .046 
Environmental Suface .105 
Environmental Condition .074 
Fall Distance .069 
Note: The Synthesis with respect to the goal lists the global weights for the risk factors. Worker Interference (0.162), Task frequency 
(0.142), and task proximity (0.120) are the highest contributing risk factors to falls. Therefore, task related factors are the leading risk 
factors that contribute to falls. 
Weight Validation 
The values in the pairwise comparison matrix are the geometric averages between the SMES judgments of 
risk factors. The sum is the total value for each column or the categorical risk factor. 
~eight Validation 
Pairwise COml)arison Matrix from Expert Choice Software 
Task Related Human Organizational Environmental 
Task Related I I 2.5 1.25 
Human/Personal I I 2.84 I 
Organizational 0.39 0.35 I 1.5 1 
Environmental 0.8 I 0.6 I 
Sum 3.19 3.35 7.3 4.76 
The values in the following table were determined by dividing each entry in the pairwise comparison matrix 
by the sum. The subject matter experts calculated the average of results for each categorical risk factor, which 
is the priority vector and compared it to the relative weights from Expert Choice Software. There results are 
similar. Therefore, the weights are confirmed valid. 
Risk Factor Vector Rank 
Task Related 0.3 13 0.298 0.342 0.262 0.304 
Human/ Personal 0.3 13 0.298 0.389 0.2 10 0.302 2 
Environmental 0.250 1 0.298 0.082 1 10 0.21 3 
0.1 22 0.104 0.136 0.3 17 0.17 4 
NASA Safety Index 
1 Fre q u ency Index (F) 
This index quantifies how frequently worker(s) would be exposed to the particular fall hazard: 
Frequen Index F : 
Term 
N!!y~r 
Occasionally 
Annually 
Monthly 
__ Weekly 
Daily 
Shift 
F O •• c rlptlo n 
_~ _ Never been accessed. 
0 .9 Worker(st at the location once every 2 to 10 years 
1.0 _ Wor~s) at the location or task is done once or twice pery ear. 
1.1 Worker(s) at the location 3- 12 tyro Monthly maintenance. "as needed" work 
1.2 Worker 5 at the location _13-52 ~ Weekly maintenance. "as needed" work 
1.3 Worke~s)~t the location on a dai!Y basis or once I shift . 
1.4 Worker(s) at the location more than once per shift or several times per day . 
. 2 Occurren ce Index (0 ) 
This index quantifies how often the particular hazard is found at the facility being studied : 
Occurrence Index 0: 
Term 0 Desc ript io n 
Unique 1 .0 Hazard occurs_ at onl~ one location. 
Rare ...J.1 Hazard occurs at two locations . 
Common 1 .2 Hazard occurs at 3 - 10 locations. 
Very Common 1 .3 Hazard occurs at more than 11 - 50 locations . 
Recurring 1.4 Hazard occurs at more than 50 locations. 
3 Proximity Index (X) 
This index reflects how close workers normally get to the hazard, as follows : 
Proxim Index X : 
Te rm 
Near 
Close 
Very 9-.lose 
Immediate 
X 
1.0 
1 .1 
1 .2 
1 .3 
Descri ptio n 
WorkE!1!) from 6 to 10 feet (1 .8 to 3 .0 m) an improperly guarded fall hazard 
Worker(s) from 3 to 6 feet (0 .9 to 1.8 mLof an improperly guarded fall hazard 
Worker(§.~om 1 to 3 feet (0.3 to 0 .9 m) of an improperly guarded fall hazard 
Worker(s) Direc tly exposed to an unguarded fall hazard or working from a ladder 
Level of Existence 
L.,'el of Existence 
Conceptual Model Factors Ranees for Fuzzy Model (Left to Riehl) 
Task Related Factors 
Task Frequency 0 .1 to 2.0 
Task Duration I .Ot02.0 
Task Proximity 1.0 to 2.0 ( in relation to Fall Distance) 
Environmental Factors 
Fall Distance 0- lOft- low (0.33). 11- 15 ft- medium (0.66), >25 ft . - hi£h 11.0l 
Environmental Surface 0.9 to 2.0 
Environmental Conditions 0.9 to 2.0 
HumanIPersonal Factors 
\Vorker Interference 1.0t02.0 
Number of workers 1 to 5 Ideoendent on workers) 
Age 21-70 (vears) 
Oreanizational Factors 
Fall Hazard Severity I to 10 
Fall Hazard Protection 0.1 to 2.0 
Fall Hazard Occ urre nce 1.0 to 2.0 
where, 
Fuzzy Quantification Linear Models 
Categorical Risk Factors for falls 
Task Related Risk Factors 
Xl = F(TR) =alwl +a2w2 +a3w3 +····.anWn 
HumanlPersonal Risk Factors 
Organizational Risk Factors 
X3 =F(O) =Cl~ +C2~ +C3U:3 + .... CnUn 
Environmental Risk Factors 
a= task related risk sub-factors relative weight 
b=humanlpersonal risk sub-factors relative weight 
c=organizational risk sub-factors relative weight 
d=environmental risk sub-factors relative weight 
w=task related risk sub-factors level of existence 
z=human/personal risk sub-factors level of existence 
u=organizational risk sub-factors level of existence 
v=environmental risk sub-factors level of existence 
where, 
Fuzzy Quantification Linear Models 
Comprehensive Risk for falls 
Y = comprehensive risk for the given condition 
Xl = the risk associated with the task related factors 
e l = weighting factor for the task related factors 
X2 = the risk associated with the human/personal factors 
e2 = weighting factor for the human/personal factors 
X3 = the risk associated with the organizational factors 
e3 = weighting factor for the organizational factors 
X4 = the risk associated with the environmental factors 
e4 = weighting factor for the environmental factors 
The weighting factors (e l , e2, e3, e4 ) represent the relative significance of the given 
risk factor category's contribution to the likelihood of injury. 
Note: The comprehensive risk is the aggregate risk value for the prediction of a fall; which is equal to the 
product of relative weight respective to the categorical risk factors. 
Model Usability 
• Design of Experiment 
- Repeated measures analysis 
• 15 Subjects 
• Between and within subjects 
- Agreement of Data 
- Variability of Data 
• NASA Ground Support Operations 
Scenarios 
- SLF-Shuttle Landing Facility 
- LCP-Launch Complex Payloads 
- V AB-Vehicle Assembly Building 
SLE 
VAB 
LCP 
NASA Scenarios 
Aggregate Risk Value and Likelihood Rating 
Aggregate Risk Value (Y) Risk Associated with Numeric Value Likelihood Rating 
0.00 - 0.20 Very Low li sk: Falls are very un like ly to occur. Strong Controls 1 
are in place. 
0 .21 - 0.40 Low ri sk: Fall s are not like ly to occur. Contro ls have mi nor 2 
limitations and uncertainties. 
0.4 1 - 0.60 Moderate ri sk: Falls may occur. Controls exist with some 3 
uncel1ainties. 
0.61 - 0.80 High risk: Falls are highly like ly to occur. Controls have 4 
significant uncertainties. 
0 .8 1 - 1.00 Very high risk: Fall s are nearly certain to occur. Contro ls have 5 
litt le or no effect. 
ASA Fall Hazard Accepted Scale 
Numerical Risk Value Risk Associa ted with the Va lue Likelihood Ra ting 
0-5 Low Ri sk Hazards I 
6-10 Medium Risk Hazards 2 
10-15 Hi gh Ri sk Hazards 3 
15-20 Dangerous Risk Hazards 4 
20-25 Ext reme Hazards 5 
--
• • 
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) 
Mate I De-mate Device Camera 
Case Study: A worker 32 years old required to conduct routine maintenance on the camera pictured 
in the red circle outside the Shuttle Landing Facility. At this site, there is no personal protection 
equipment. The maintenance includes lens cleaning, adjusting, focusing, etc. Once outside the 
guardrail railing, workers are exposed to a fall distance is approximately 100 ft. to the ground. 
Launch Complex Payloads (LCP) 
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LC 39 A & B - Payload Platforms 
Case Study: A 47 year old worker is working off payload platforms at any level in this 
NASA/KSC facility on the orbiter payloads. There is minimal lighting in the facility for the 
workers. The fall distance is 60 + ft off platforms. All edges of platforms are unguarded. 
There is no fall protection equipment present. 
Vehicle Assembly Building (V AB) 
Building Roof 
Case Study: During construction, up to three workers (25 years of age) replace and repair roof material 
near the edge of the VAB roof. Temporary Horizontal lifeli ne is installed (solid yellow line). A vertical line 
lifeline (dotted yellow line) is mounted to adjust the system to the proper length. The fall distance is in 
excess of 500 ft and contingent upon what location or perimeter of the roof where the fall may occur. 
Scenario Characteristics 
Work Area SLF LCP VAB 
Faclor 
Task Duration 1.2-Medium 1.2-MediuITI 1.2 Medium 
Task Frequency l.I -Monthly 1.3-Daily 1.4-Shift 
Task Proximity 1.2-Very close 1.2-Very close 1.2-Very close 
Fall Distance 100ft. 6D ft . SOO ft. 
Environmental Conditions 1.2-Extreme I.D-Good 1.1 - Variable 
Environmental Surface l.I -Poor D.9-Excellent D.9 Excellent 
Age 32 47 25 
# of workers I worker I worker 3 workers 
Worker Interference I.D-Independent I .D Independent 1.2-Multiple 
Fal l Occurrence I.D-Unique 1.2-Common 1.2-Common 
Fall Severity S.D-Extreme S.D-Extreme S.D-Extreme 
F:1I1 l'rU!eclion O.75·Poor I.G-Nolll: O.75· Poor 
Scenario Level of Existence 
Work Area SLF LCP VAB 
Factor 
Task Durat ion .4 .4 .4 
Task Frequency .95 .74 .63 
Task Prox imity .4 .4 .4 
Fall Distance 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Environmental Conditions .54 .18 .36 
Erwironmental Surface .36 0 0 
Age .45 .94 .16 
Number of workers 0 0 
W orker Interference 0 0 .4 
Fall Occurrence 0 .4 .4 
Fall Severity .88 .88 .88 
Fall Protect ion .68 .94 .68 
Note: The values were calculated using an Excel (Fuzzificationj spreadsheet. 
Model Usability Hypotheses 
(Null and Alternative) 
Ho: The p-val ue provide the likelihood of obtaining the 
sample, with its Kendall's coefficient, agreement within 
subject is due to chance. 
HI: The p-value provide the likelihood of obtaining the 
sample, with its Kendall's coefficient, agreement within 
subject is not due to chance. 
Agreement of Data 
SubJect .. ! ' • 
-
, . 
, 
Subject I 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 2 1.00 3 2 67 .1353 (9.43, 99.16) 
Subject 3 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 4 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 5 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 6 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 7 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 8 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 9 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 10 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 11 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 12 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 13 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 14 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Subject 15 1.00 3 3 100 .1353 (36.84, 100.00) 
Overall 1.00 
The following resul ts show that the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance is 1.00, which indicates the outstanding high 
degree of agreement between and within the subjects. Because the p-values a re greater than the alpha level for all 
subjects, accept the null hypothesis. Agreement within the subject is due to chance and the p-value provide the 
likelihood of obtaining the sample. As a result, there is a relative agreement among the subjects in the likelihood of 
falls. 
~----------------------------------------- --
Variability 
Multiple descriptive statistics for a 95 % confidence interval and t-test are 
the following: 
Coefficient of Variation 
Variance 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
• I 
21.36 
0.251 
2.34 
0.501 
,., - ~.: .~ , '"" - "', -f~ 
- l .'" .' . '. ;;; 
_ • o. ':3 
... r~ ...... ;!.':., .... ""~::..:I.. .... _..:~ 
Therefore, there is minimal variability with the fuzzy AHP modeling. 
Model Validation 
Scenario Comprehensive Fuzzy AHP NASAIKSC 
Risk for Falls (Y) model: current 
Predicted Model: 
Likelihood Accepted 
Rating Likelihood 
Rating 
Shuttle Landing 0.404 2 2 
Facility (SLF) 
Launch Complex 0.351 2 3 
Payloads (LCP) 
Vehicle Assembly 0.451 3 3 
Building (VAB) 
Percentage Error 
m (predicted - accepted) 
-Ioe rro r == ~-----------==----------.:.... 
accepted 
For Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) 
o % error (2 .0 - 2 .0 ) 
2.0 
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) 0 % 
Launch Complex Payloads (LCP) 33 % 
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) 0% 
Empirical Approach 
NASA Risk Scorecard 
5 
Consequence 
Safety 
NASA Safety Risk Scorecard 
Consequence 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
Personnel Minor Injury Injury Injury or Severe injury or Loss of Life or permanently 
requiling first illness; medical hospitalization disabling injury 
aid treatment treatment 
System Safety Minor Minor damage Minor damage Loss of mission , Loss of Flight or Ground Assets 
(Falls) damage or to the to flight, major damage to or Loss of vehicle prior to 
non essential program Ground SUppOI1 flight , completing its mISSIOn 
flight s assets critical needs assets, Catastrophic hazard 
Environmental Negligible; Minor Moderate Major OSHAfEPA Selious or repeat OSHAfEPA 
OSHA/EPA repol1ab le OSHA/EPA violation causing violation; telmination of project 
violation non OSHA/EPA violation which temporary stoppage or program 
repOl1ab le violation; reqUIres 
repOl1able immediate 
remediation 
NOTE: Constellation ORION Project: High Bay Area with an excessive fall distance. There is no Personal Protection Equipment 
(PPE) or spotter I)resent. For example, a NASA Safety Expert will evaluate this scenario as a 4 x 5 (Catastrophic Hazard-RED). 
Conclusion 
• Research Questions Addressed 
• Research Hypotheses Addressed 
• Research Contributions Addressed 
• Research Limitations 
• It is confirmed that falls are preventable by 
multidimensional assessment and targeted 
intervention 
43 
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